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I raqi Freedom offers not only a reprise of un-finished business from the Persian Gulf War,it is the third invasion of Iraq by GreatBritain since independence in 1932. During
World War II, Winston Churchill ordered his
commander in chief, Middle East, General Sir
Archibald Wavell, to march on Baghdad. The rea-
son for intervention was strikingly similar to that
advanced more than fifty years later: to preempt
Axis support for Rashid Ali el Gailani, a violently
anti-British Arab nationalist, who threatened
British interests. The occupation would also strike
a blow at terrorism orchestrated by a charismatic
Islamic cleric. Finally, intervention would protect
oil reserves vital to the war effort.
Churchill forced the offensive on Wavell,
who favored a diplomatic approach. The general
argued against an invasion in terms that mirrored
recent objections—he lacked the resources to add
Iraq to a long list of military commitments. He
believed intervention would make the region less
secure because Iraqi antagonism was linked to
Palestine. Wavell urged accepting a Turkish offer
to mediate so London could take care of pressing
affairs elsewhere.
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The Origins
The British accorded sovereignty to Iraq in
1932, making it the first former Turkish colony in
the Middle East to gain independence. However,
because Basra and Baghdad were important as an
air link and land passage between India and
British-controlled Palestine and the Suez canal, a
treaty that permitted Commonwealth troops to
transit Iraq also required Baghdad to “give all aid,
including the use of railways, rivers, ports, and
airfields” in the event of war. Iraq undertook to
provide security, especially protecting the
pipelines that ran from the Mosel and Kirkuk oil-
fields in northern Iraq to Haifa on the Mediter-
ranean. By 1937, the British presence had been
reduced to two Royal Air Force (RAF) bases, one at
Shaibah, close to Basra, and the other at Hab-
baniya, on the Euphrates near Baghdad.
Yet anti-British sentiment persisted, espe-
cially in the army, whose officers resented foreign
influence, took offense at the refusal to provide
arms, and opposed Jewish emigration to Pales-
tine. But little could be done because the
Hashimite monarchy was imported from Saudi
Arabia in the wake of World War I and did not
have deep roots in the country. It was weakened
by association with the British and utterly de-
pendent on the army to keep order, especially
after both the Assyrian rebellion in 1933 and the
tribal rebellions of 1935–36
were crushed. In this tumult,
Iraqi officers organized a se-
cret society known as the
Golden Square and kept an
eye on the throne to monitor
the slightest pro-British tilt. Distrust of Great
Britain led many Iraqis to attribute the automo-
bile accident that took the life of King Faisal in
1939 to British agents. His demise cleared the way
for the Golden Square to act as the principal
power broker in the country.
Iraq was obligated by treaty to side with
Britain when World War II broke out. But the
government of the four-year-old king, under di-
rection of an uncle who served as regent, proved
too feeble to surmount the opposition of the
prime minister. A lawyer and cofounder of the
Muslim Brotherhood, whose cells were active
across the Middle East, Rashid Ali el Gailani was a
passionate supporter of the Arab cause in the face
of Zionist penetration of Palestine. Early Axis tri-
umphs and the arrival of an Italian armistice
commission to monitor the Vichy military in
Syria emboldened Rashid Ali. British insistence
that Iraq break diplomatic relations with Italy
brought the situation to the brink in early 1941.
When the war cabinet recommended sending a
division from India to occupy Basra, Wavell ob-
jected that British troops would only enflame na-
tionalism. His decision left RAF bases in Iraq vul-
nerable, guarded only by a locally recruited
constabulary with armored cars.
After the fall of France, the Italian declara-
tion of war, and the RAF victory in the Battle of
Britain, the focus of the war shifted to the eastern
Mediterranean. Iraq was merely one piece in a
complex geopolitical jigsaw puzzle that ran from
Cairo to Tehran. And while Britain had strengths,
most notably the Royal Navy based in Alexandria,
its principal vulnerability was the volatility of a
region ripe for Axis exploitation.
Religion and Politics
Of particular concern was the intrigue by
Amin al-Husseini, the grand mufti of Jerusalem,
who sought refuge in Baghdad after being exiled
in 1937. His delicate features and gentle manner
accentuated by deep blue eyes, trim goatee, and
calm voice, concealed a zealous and violent na-
ture. A former Ottoman artillery officer turned
teacher, al-Husseini was sentenced to ten years in
prison by the British for his part in anti-Jewish
riots in 1920 in Jerusalem. In a gesture of mis-
placed leniency, he was pardoned and stood for
grand mufti in the following year, an office that
normally went to jurists who arbitrated disputes
by interpreting Koranic law.
The British calculated that there was nothing
to lose in allowing al-Husseini to play the role
since he had no adherents in the Arab commu-
nity. This proved to be a mistake. As grand mufti,
he was poised to exploit Arab-Jewish tension that
began with the exodus of Jews to Palestine in the
1930s. His anti-British and anti-Semitic rhetoric
found an audience in a growing middle class,
which, ironically, had prospered as the result of
Jewish economic activities. As president of the
Supreme Muslim Council, he controlled religious
schools and courts as well as trust funds that
spread his message in Iraq and Syria. He also
launched attacks on Jewish settlements and assas-
sinated moderate Arabs who urged compromise
but were marginalized by terrorism and Islamic
fundamentalism.
Moreover, the mufti benefitted from a de-
cline in British fortunes. After 1938, Germany,
Italy, and even Spain fueled Arab nationalism with
radio broadcasts, cultural subsidies, and anti-Se-
mitic literature that was translated and distributed
through schools by al-Husseini. Palestinians imi-
tated fascist organizations and praised Nazi racial
laws, dreaming of a day when Germany and Italy
would eject the British and the Jews from the Mid-
dle East. The evenhandedness of Great Britain
found few takers in the region. Palestine was rife
Iraq was obligated by treaty
to side with Britain when
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with rebellion with the outbreak of war in 1940.
Some 20,000 British soldiers maintained order be-
tween Muslim extremists and Jewish militants,
who conducted raids as far away as Syria and
Lebanon. In late 1940, the British discovered that
the Iraqi army was training a unit of Palestinians
and Iraqis to fight for the mufti. The ambassador
to Baghdad reported that, so long as London re-
fused to adopt a more pro-Arab policy in Pales-
tine, “in Iraq, we get the disadvantages.”1
Arab nationalist feeling within the army, in-
trigue on the part of the grand mufti, and anti-
British posturing by Rashid Ali combined to bring
Iraq to the brink of civil war. On the night of
March 31, 1941, tipped off that officers planned
to move against him, the regent escaped across
the Tigris in a motorboat and made his way to
the RAF base at Habbaniya, from which he was
flown to Basra and asylum on board HMS
Cockchafer. On April 3, Rashid Ali el Gailani seized
power with the help of army and air force officers
of the Golden Square and proclaimed a national
defense government. He warned the British am-
bassador against intervention in internal affairs
and dispatched a force to Basra to block British
troops from landing.
The coup in Baghdad threatened British in-
terests by severing the air link and land route be-
tween India and Egypt, endangering supplies
from the northern oilfields on which defense of
the Mediterranean depended, and allowing a na-
tionalist success in Iraq to subvert the tenuous
position of Great Britain in Egypt and Palestine.
Against this threat, Wavell argued that his hands
were full in spring 1941. He evacuated three divi-
sions and an armored brigade from Greece and
prepared to defend Crete against German assault.
An offensive against Italian forces in East Africa
was about to start. Moreover, a little-known
enemy general, Erwin Rommel, had launched a
surprise offensive into Cyrenaica in March with a
reinforced German and four Italian divisions,
driven to the Egyptian frontier, and invested
36,000 British troops at Tobruk. To Wavell, even
with enough forces on hand, this was hardly the
moment to ignite Arab volatility.
Intervention
Wavell contended that he had more impor-
tant fires to put out, which brought his relation-
ship with Churchill to the boil. On the surface,
the prime minister and the general should have
gotten along famously. Both were aristocrats and
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veterans of the Boer War and World War I as well
as authors and historians with prodigious memo-
ries. Both realized they were fighting a conflict
that required difficult strategic choices. And both
had a proclivity for unorthodox solutions tem-
pered by common sense. But that was the end of
their similarities.
Churchill was a man of strategic imagination
who demanded enthusiasm that bordered on
zealotry from subordinates. Wavell was a meticu-
lous planner with a talent for
administrative detail. He was
much more attuned to the
complexities of an operation
than to its visionary possibili-
ties. Although regarded as a
premier army trainer, Wavell
was too cerebral and taciturn
for Churchill. Conversely, the prime minister
constantly meddled in campaign planning and
initiated courses of action from 3,000 miles away,
often in excruciating detail. Wavell responded by
shielding information from London. This lack of
transparency markedly increased the distrust that
Churchill harbored for his commander in chief,
Middle East.
By early 1941, Churchill was beyond tempo-
rizing. “War,” he said, “is a contest of wills.”2 He
had chosen to make a major commitment to the
eastern Mediterranean—against the advice of his
chiefs—because there Britain could take the of-
fensive and showcase its value as an ally of the
United States. By vigorous action, he would dis-
tance himself from the appeasement policies of
Neville Chamberlain. An invasion of Iraq would
forestall Axis intervention and force Baghdad to
break with Italy, eliminate Rashid Ali and al-Hus-
seini, reinforce British rights of transit, and bring
Turkey into the war with Mosul as the prize.
On orders of the chiefs of staff, Delhi landed
a brigade at Basra on April 30, the vanguard of
10th Indian Division, which was en route to Iraq.
Rashid Ali, who preferred to avoid confrontation
until he could solidify support, decided that time
was not on his side. As a result, he assembled a
brigade armed with artillery to eliminate the air
base at Habbaniya before it could be reinforced.
In London, the April 30 news that a large Iraqi
force had invested Habbaniya caused the chiefs to
exult that their intervention in Basra had caused
Rachid Ali’s plot to go off at half-cock before the
Axis could organize support for the regime. But in
the short term, it was unclear who had pre-
empted whom. Habbaniya was an airfield that
housed a training school of 1,000 airmen to-
gether with 9,000 civilians, many British depend-
ents. It was defended by a seven-mile iron fence
and constabulary of 1,200 Iraqi and Assyrian
levies backed by armored cars under a British lieu-
tenant colonel. Even an attacker with a poor
grasp of tactics had to realize that eliminating the
water tower or power station at Habbaniya would
compromise any resistance.
The best defense of Habbaniya lay in air-
power. But the task was left to half-trained stu-
dent pilots flying a fleet of 78 mostly obsolete bi-
planes, some hastily rigged to carry bomb loads
as small as 20 pounds, hardly more than air-
launched grenades. The arrival of eight Welling-
ton medium bombers from Egypt capable of de-
livering 4,500-pound bomb loads, a few Gladiator
biplanes and Hurricane fighters, the warhorse of
the Battle of Britain, and 300 soldiers airlifted
from the RAF base at Shaibah afforded some pro-
tection against two battalions that invested the
base on April 30. A buildup of Iraqi forces outside
the base to brigade size led the commander at
Habbaniya, Air Vice-Marshal H.G. Smart, to con-
clude that attack was the best form of defense.
At 0500 hours on May 2, the bombers and
fighters struck Iraqi forces, who answered with an
artillery barrage on Habbaniya. The Iraqi air force,
based outside Baghdad at Rashid, rendered a good
account of itself, especially against student pilots
in trainers. Smart directed subsequent attacks on
Rashid and lines of communication. Fast twin-en-
gine Blenheim medium bombers with 1,000-
pound bombs, escorted by long-range Hurricanes,
arrived from Egypt to pound airfields in Baghdad
and Mosel, where a small Luftwaffe detachment
was based. After four days of bombing and raids
by the King’s Own Royal Regiment, the Iraqis
the Iraqi air force rendered
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withdrew, leaving burning trucks and exploding
ammunition along the road to Baghdad courtesy
of the Royal Air Force.
Axis Intrigue
The defence committee in London, armed
with Ultra intercepts detailing pleas from Iraq for
Axis support, and worried by broadcasts by the
mufti calling for jihad against “the greatest foe of
Islam,” obliged a reluctant Wavell to invade be-
fore the enemy organized support for Rashid Ali.
For his part, Wavell argued in favor of accepting a
Turkish offer to mediate the crisis on the basis of
a cessation of hostilities against a promise by
Rashid Ali that Axis forces would not be allowed
into Iraq. Churchill rejected this option but left
open the possibility of ceding Mosul to Turkey as
encouragement to enter the war. Axis propaganda
extolling Rashid Ali gave the impression that
London had coordinated his coup with Berlin
and Rome.
The prime minister had no intention of al-
lowing the new regime to pull in Axis reinforce-
ments or encourage imitators among nationalist
officers and supporters of the grand mufti in
Egypt. But Wavell argued without avail against
stripping Palestine and the Trans-Jordan of its
overtaxed garrison to invade Iraq. He reluctantly
assembled 5,800 men (known as Habforce) in
Palestine under Major General J.G.W. Clark for
the march on Baghdad. Churchill became so an-
noyed at the dispatches from Wavell and the lack
of preparation by 1st Cavalry Division in Pales-
tine, much of it on horseback and without anti-
aircraft guns, that he came close to sacking him.
The preventative invasion of Iraq caught
Germany off guard, mainly because its diplomats
and military were divided over the question of
exploiting Arab nationalism. The foreign office in
Berlin had been in contact with the mufti. But
Hitler preferred to leave policy formulation on
the Mediterranean and Middle East to Rome. The
Wehrmacht high command, whose views on Ital-
ian competence are unprintable, supported Arab
nationalist movements to undermine Britain.
Nevertheless, the Iraqi rebellion surprised the
Germans, who were engaged in ending cam-
paigns in the Balkans and Greece, mounting an
assault on Crete, and planning Barbarossa, the in-
vasion of Russia scheduled for June 1941. Admiral
Jean Darlan, reeling from the Royal Navy attack
on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir near Oran in
July 1940, offered to release Vichy war stocks in
Syria, including aircraft, permit passage of Ger-
man war matériel across Syria, and provide an air
link for German support to Rashid Ali from Axis-
occupied Rhodes.
By the time Hitler declared that the Arab lib-
eration movement was a natural ally, Churchill
had preempted Axis intervention. Nor did Iraq
further its cause by mistakenly shooting down
the plane with Major Axel von Bloomberg, a Ger-
man negotiator sent to coordinate military sup-
port. Despite efforts by Rudolf Rahn, the German
representative on the Italian armistice commis-
sion in Syria, to run trains of arms, munitions,
and spare parts to Iraq through Turkey and Syria,
and the intervention of Axis planes, the five Iraqi
divisions and 60 serviceable aircraft were no
match for a force of 200 aircraft. Habforce, spear-
headed by the Arab Legion, reached Habbaniya
on May 18 after crossing 500 miles of searing
desert in a week. By this time, RAF bombers had
annihilated the Iraqi air force and extended at-
tacks to Syrian bases that serviced Axis planes.
Many members of the Iraqi regime applied for
Syrian visas.
Occupation
The British occupied Basra in mid-May
1941, asserted their rights under the 1930 treaty,
lifted the siege of Habbaniya, and temporarily
averted Axis intervention. But their next move
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staff argued for continued pounding of the Iraqis
to “defeat and discredit the leaders in the hope
that Rashid’s government would be replaced.”3
For his part, the commander in chief, India,
made a case for marching to Baghdad followed
by the military occupation of northern Iraq,
which offered the only long-term guarantee
against Axis intervention. Churchill compro-
mised, ordering Clark to march Habforce to
Baghdad but at the same time assuring Wavell
that he would not have to commit scarce forces
to a long-term occupation of northern Iraq until
Rommel was defeated. 
The Iraqi army, fighting from behind de-
fense lines along canals and fields flooded by
water from tributaries of the Euphrates, put up a
respectable resistance against Habforce, which di-
vided into columns and advanced from three di-
rections. On May 30, Habforce scattered the Iraqi
units supported by Italian aircraft on the out-
skirts of the capital. To avoid urban warfare,
Clark bluffed; an interpreter called the headquar-
ters of Rashid Ali with exaggerated claims of
British strength. The Iraqi leader, who was de-
moralized by the lack of Axis support, fled to Per-
sia with the rump of the Golden Square and the
grand mufti in tow. The British signed a lenient
armistice that allowed the Iraqi army to retain its
weapons and return to their barracks. Wavell left
the administration of Baghdad to Iraqis. The pro-
British regent regained the throne on June 1, but
order disintegrated as Jewish merchants became
targets of outraged nationalists and free-lance
looters. The British army, camped outside the
city, did not intervene.
Regime change in Iraq created dominoes. Un-
settled by the Vichy invitation for Germany to use
Syrian air bases and goaded by the Free French
under Charles de Gaulle, Churchill ordered the in-
vasion of Syria and Lebanon, which fell in mid-
July after a six-week campaign. In August, British
and Soviet forces invaded Persia, overthrowing
Reza Shah and replacing him with his son, Mo-
hammad Reza Pahlavi. Axis attempts to stoke Arab
nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism to un-
dermine the British base in the Middle East and
eastern Mediterranean had been quashed.
Fast Forward
The American campaigns against Saddam
Hussein and Osama bin Laden offer a reprise of
the crusade by Churchill against Rashid Ali and
the grand mufti in 1941. The three arguments the
President advanced in 2002 for regime change in
Iraq—preempting Saddam Hussein before he ac-
quired weapons of mass destruction and the
means to deliver them, the link between Iraq and
terrorism, and the danger that a region contain-
ing 20 percent of world oil supplies could fall
under the control of a regime that might employ
the resources for malevolent purposes—mirror
the points Churchill made in a different yet simi-
lar context over sixty years ago.
In 1941, Iraqi resistance against even a
hastily organized, underarmed, outnumbered,
and poorly supplied force proved illusory, much
as Iraqi resistance collapsed in the Persian Gulf
War. Nevertheless, the debate in London on how
far to go proved remarkably similar to 1991. Un-
like President George H.W. Bush, however,
Churchill opted for regime change over the ad-
vice of his commander, who was content with
discrediting the leadership in the hope that Iraqis
would take matters into their own hands. Despite
inflammatory nationalist rhetoric, support for the
regime of Rashid Ali proved as shallow among
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Lessons of History
A more important question is what Britain
gained from preventative war. The short answer is
that London solidified its position in the Middle
East by preempting Axis intervention and also
bought time to bring a major ally on line, re-
versed the tide of war in the Mediterranean the-
ater that in spring 1941 strongly favored the Axis,
and emerged among the victors of World War II.
But even before the war ended, British power in
the Middle East had begun to wane, beginning in
Palestine. Iraq, Iran, and Egypt were in turmoil by
the 1950s.
The prevailing verdict on British interaction
with Arab countries during World War II is that
by invading Iraq and Persia, exiling the mufti,
sponsoring Zionist counter-
terror groups, and using
heavy-handed tactics in
Egypt, London fueled the




gional interests. Stability in the Middle East, the
British ambassador to Baghdad argued in 1941,
hinged on Palestine. No amount of intervention
to produce regime change elsewhere would re-
solve that problem. At least one writer argues that
Wavell was correct, that Turkish mediation and
the threat of British force could have produced a
compromise that would have preserved British
forces for more pressing operations and limited
Arab resentment against colonialist policies.4
Although few lifted a finger to defend Rashid
Ali and the Golden Square, the years from 1941
to 1945 became known to Iraqis as the second oc-
cupation, a time of reconstruction characterized
by heavy British troop presence, deep purges in
the army and administration, and electoral fraud
to ensure that only supporters of the regent
served in parliament. Stable government under
the British brought a welcome alternative to the
turmoil of the 1930s, but the long-term benefits
were less certain. The regime reinforced its ties
with tribal chiefs and favored landowners. Peas-
ants fled to the burgeoning slums of Baghdad.
Sunni politicians allowed Shias and Kurds only
cosmetic participation in the political process.
The democratic impulse in Iraq was stillborn,
while the monarchy labored with little success to
build a popular following. The army, courted as a
symbol of national unity by the monarchy and
considered a requirement for internal order by
the British, retained its grip on areas traditionally
difficult to govern. This proved a costly solution.
A growing effendi class of educated mid-level pro-
fessionals and army officers attracted to pan-Arab
ideas and agitated by the continued conflict in
Palestine articulated their discontent. The army
removed the monarchy in 1958, and Iraq entered
a period of murderous instability from which Sad-
dam Hussein emerged in 1979 to seize power.
The challenge is translating victory over Sad-
dam Hussein into a program that will stabilize a
region inclined toward effervescence and avoid
the need for a repeat intervention. The British ex-
perience reveals that regime change alone is no
panacea. While it will eliminate the immediate
problem, it will not lead to lasting change unless
Iraq is placed on a more democratic footing, and
the festering sore in the region—the Israel-Pales-
tine dispute—is equitably resolved. JFQ
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that London fueled the
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and Islamic fundamentalism
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